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A Psychology of Choice of Laws
GARY LOW*
Abstract
There is certainly a lot of choice going around in the market for contract law. This 
is a good thing, since choice is key to self-determination and may help improve 
our laws. Yet there may be such a thing as choice overload, and the introduction 
of the Common European Sales Law is a timely reminder to consider its effect for 
the market for contract law. This article does just that. It explains what choice 
overload is, why it comes about, and what can be done to ameliorate its effects. 
The conclusion is that CESL will not cause choice overload but will not help in 
that respect either. Given the prospect of overload, this article evaluates the pos-
sible solutions to the problem, and advances the argument in favour of categorizing 
laws in order to help decision-makers to choose prudently.
1. Introduction
Choosing is nothing new to us, whether in our roles as lawyers or as the man on 
the street. Choices1 confront us at every waking moment and are ever increasing 
in abundance. Whether one is faced with deciding which flavour of jam to spread 
across the breakfast toast, where in the world to vacation, or which law should 
govern a contract – the possibilities are seemingly endless. Given the proliferation 
of choice, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Commission, catering to hitherto unful-
filled preferences of private parties,2 has proposed a Common European Sales Law 
(CESL).3 Being an optional instrument, CESL adds to the buffet of transnational, 
national and soft laws that parties may already choose from as regards applicable 
laws to contracts. 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University; Fellow, Maastricht European Pri-
vate Law Institute. I thank Maartje de Visser for helpful comments on earlier drafts, and Sinead Hayward 
for editorial assistance. Any views and all errors herein remain my own.
1 The nouns ‘choice’, ‘alternative’ and ‘option’, as well as ‘choice set’ and ‘assortment’ are treated 
as synonyms in this article.
2 See for instance E. Clive, A General Perspective on the European Commission’s Proposal on a 
Common European Sales Law 19(1) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 120 (2012). 
3 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European 
Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 ﬁnal.
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While there are those who have welcomed more choice, some quarters have gin-
gerly raised the prospect that the market for contract laws in Europe is already 
cluttered and CESL will merely inflict an informational and choice overload for 
end-users.4 As this possibility has yet to be thoroughly explored, the aim of this 
article is to consider the problem of, and solution to, overload in Europe’s market 
for contract law. 
It should be noted that choice overload does not boil down to a straightforward 
totting up of numbers. It does not simply occur when a decision maker is faced with 
a large array of alternatives. Certain conditions, in totality, explain why having more 
choices may lead to a less – or less fulﬁlling – choice experience. Choice overload 
has signiﬁcant theoretical and practical consequences. For one, the notion of overload 
itself conﬂicts with classical economic theories on choice that are indifferent to an 
inﬁnite increase in the choice set. For another, given the way choosers react to the 
number of choices in any given domain, policy makers have to rethink whether sim-
ply offering more choice is the best way to help choosers achieve the best outcomes.5 
This is also true for the law market and CESL.
This article is structured as follows. After providing an overview of the pros and 
cons of (more) choice, the factors contributing to overload are set out (section 2.1), 
including a juxtaposition of the consequences between having a large and small 
assortment of choices (section 2.2). Applying these insights to the law market (section 
2.3), the argument will be advanced that overload is a real possibility for users who 
are inter alia unfamiliar with this domain, and who do not have sufﬁcient expertise 
to compare the different laws on offer. It has to be stressed that not all users are likely 
to suffer from overload. Furthermore, it is unlikely that CESL’s introduction will 
cause overload, though it may in some situations exacerbate the effect (section 2.4). 
Given the possibility of overload, two solutions are proffered. The ﬁrst suggestion is 
simply to reduce the number of laws, though admittedly, there may be political resis-
tance to this scientiﬁc solution (section 3.1). The second suggestion is to reduce the 
cognitive load of end users by having them think about what they want to get out of 
their choice, and to structure the available choices around end users’ preferences. An 
attempt is then made to apply this latter strategy to the market for laws, facilitated by 
advances in technology, and showing how this might encourage customisation of laws 
– i.e. dépeçage. However, the difﬁculties in implementation stem from how to deter-
mine what those categories are and how to compare. Established scholarship in com-
parative law is of limited help since these categories are geared towards academic 
purposes rather than end user preferences. What is needed – and only sporadically 
present – is evidence of what those preferences are. Finally, there is a discussion on 
4 See for instance R. Sefton-Green, Choice, Certainty and Diversity: Why More is Less 7 European 
Review of Contract Law 134 (2011), J. Cartwright, Choice is Good. Really? 7 European Review of 
Contract Law 335 (2011), and V. Mak, Policy Choices in European Consumer Law: Regulation through 
‘Targeted Differentiation’ 7 European Review of Contract Law 257 (2011).
5 See B. Scheibehenne, R. Greifeneder. and P.M. Todd, Can There Ever Be Too Many Options? 
A Meta-Analytic Review of Choice Overload 37 Journal of Consumer Research 409 (2010).
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the need for such preferences to be commensurate and as such comparable, for 
 otherwise the comparative endeavour would not be possible. Section 4 concludes.
2. Choice
i. Why More is Good … and Bad
Choice is often equated with liberty; the latter being a cherished value in law. 
Sprung from the Enlightenment, liberal theories of man dictate that the State must 
refrain from unnecessarily constraining the actions of its citizens, respect their 
dignity, and permit them to pursue any legitimate aims. Thus it is from the Enlight-
enment that one derives the freedom to enter a contract, draft its terms, and also 
be able to choose its governing law.6 This freedom, also known as party autonomy, 
is a hallmark of contemporary contract doctrine. 
The above description ties in with psychological notions about choice. Choice 
expresses self-determination, that is to say, a person’s ability and desire to control his 
actions and his environs. It is in that sense seen as desirable. Those who perceived 
themselves as having exercised the faculty of choice derived greater satisfaction from 
the outcome of that choice as opposed to those whose choices were dictated by others.7 
Furthermore, satisfaction is not the only consequence of having the opportunity to 
choose. Individuals who were self-determinate8 were intrinsically more self-moti-
vated than those who were not.9 Thus, by way of example, residents in a nursing 
home were in better health and better enjoyed their stay after they were given the 
responsibility to decide on seemingly mundane affairs like how to arrange the 
furniture in their rooms or how to spend their time at the nursing home.10
6  See P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford University Press 1985), 
L. Boldeman, The Cult of the Market: Economic Fundamentalism and its Discontents Ch. 9 (ANU E 
Press 2011), S. Grundmann and W. Kerber, European System of Contract Laws – A Map for Combining 
the Advantages of Centralised and Decentralised Rule-Making in S. Grundmann and J. Stuyck (eds), 
An Academic Green Paper on European Contract Law (2002), C-W. Canaris and H.C. Grigoleit , The 
Interpretation of Contracts in A. Hartkamp and others (eds), Towards a European Civil Code (Kluwer 
Law International 2011).
7 See J.R. Averill, Personal Control Over Aversive Stimuli and its Relationship to Stress 80 Psy-
chological Bulletin 286 (1973) (brief review of literature asserting that personal responsibility over 
choice is stress relieving).
8 In this context, those who could choose when to do what and for how long.
9 See M. Zuckerman and others, On the Importance of Self-Determination for Intrinsically-Moti-
vated Behavior 4 Pers Soc Psychol Bull 443 (1978).
10 See E. Langer and J. Rodin, The Effects of Choice and Enhanced Personal Responsibility for 
the Aged: A Field Experiment in an Institutional Setting 34 Journal of Personality & Social Psychol-
ogy 191(1976). Thus in what Brown et al.  call the ‘lure of choice’, people preferred ‘options that 
allow them to make further choices over time over those that do not, even when the extra choices 
cannot improve the ultimate outcome’ – see N.J. Brown, D. Read and B. Summers, The Lure of Choice 
16 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 297 (2003).
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From an economic perspective, increasing the number of choices enables purvey-
ors and purchasers of goods to better match and express their preferences. On the 
demand side, a greater array of options enables the consumers to more fully consider 
the combination of goods and services which gives him the most welfare.11 On the 
supply side, offering a wider variety of products allows producers to cater to varying 
consumer preferences than otherwise, and this may increase their own welfare through 
a realisation of greater revenue and proﬁts.12 Importantly, it has been suggested that 
those who provide more choice gain a competitive advantage over those who offer 
less.13 Put simply, according to this line of reasoning, having as large a variety of 
choice satisﬁes as many people as possible. Furthermore, offering more choice is 
pareto efﬁcient. The person who has already matched his preference with his choice 
is not worse-off by additional choice – which he can simply ignore – and he who can 
more closely match his preference to the now-available choice is, by deﬁnition, bet-
ter off.
Finally, having a large variety of choice at one’s ﬁngertips is said to be beneﬁcial 
because it reduces search costs, allows the decision maker to engage in more direct 
comparisons as between the alternatives, and allows him to get a more global view 
of the quality of the options he has.14 Doing so may, it has been suggested, lead to 
better-informed decision-making.15
From the above accounts, whether one anchors it in liberty or efﬁciency, choice is 
to be embraced as a good thing. Yet, while there is an intuitive attraction to having 
(more) choice, having too much choice may have negative consequences. If there is 
such a thing as having a choice glut, rather than improving the quality of choice in 
Europe’s market16 for contract laws, CESL’s introduction may actually make things 
worse. 
What are the problems associated with too large an assortment? The ﬁrst has to do 
with information overload. As the size of the assortment increases, so does the amount 
of information the decision maker has to process in order to arrive at a reasonably 
informed decision. In the same way a computer slows down or crashes when programs 
tax its resources, larger assortments require more time and energy in order to evaluate 
and compare each and every alternative. This slows the decision maker down to a 
point where his cognitive resources are exhausted.
11 See C. Anderson, The Longer Long Tail: How Endless Choice is Creating Unlimited Demand 
(2 edn, Random House Business 2009).
12 See N.J. Bown, D. Read and B. Summers, The Lure of Choice 16 Journal of Behavioral Decision 
Making 297 (2003).
13 See H. Oppewal and K. Koelemeijer, More choice is Better: Effects of Assortment Size and Com-
position on Assortment Evaluation 22 International Journal of Research in Marketing 45 (2005).
14 See B. Scheibehenne, R. Greifeneder and P.M. Todd, Can There Ever Be Too Many Options? 
A Meta-Analytic Review of Choice Overload (above n 5).
15 Ibid.
16 The term ‘law market’ is taken from L.E. Ribstein and E. O’Hara, The Law Market (Oxford 
University Press 2009), and rests on notions of regulatory competition – on which see C.M. Tiebout, 
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures 64 The Journal of Political Economy 416 (1956).
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Not only is the number of choices relevant but also their attributes. By way of 
illustration, respondents in an experiment were asked to distinguish the frequency, 
intensity and duration of musical notes. Where the notes clearly sounded different, 
respondents could more accurately distinguish between the notes themselves, but 
failed to accurately pinpoint the manner(s) by which they differed. This form of judg-
ment is ‘crude’ in that respondents tended to be able to easily tell that several things 
differed, but struggled to say how they were different.17 Thus, where the attributes of 
the alternatives are too similar, decision-makers must invest greater amounts of cog-
nitive resource to discern their differences, and still face the risk of being unable to 
properly compare each alternative.
A second – related – issue is that of decisional paralysis.18 In a nutshell, the exten-
siveness of the choices arrayed before us is like a tidal wave washing over our facul-
ties.19 This phenomenon is especially acute where the large assortment gives rise to 
several acceptable alternatives and where, in terms of their attributes, each alternative 
is too similar to the other for an accurate comparison to be made. The resulting dif-
ﬁculty in coming to a justiﬁable decision gives rise to choice overload.
The notion that there can be too much choice is by no means new. Aristotle, for 
instance, fretted over how a man being equidistant between both food and drink and 
who is equally hungry and thirsty would rationally choose between the two.. Buridan, 
in similar vein, concluded that a donkey facing two haystacks would starve to death, 
since it cannot decide which stack to eat.20 Alexander de Tocqueville observed how 
choice overload plagued American society as early as the 1830s.21 That having been 
said, contemporary interest on the problem of overload is keen, especially given the 
explosion of choice brought about by increasing material wealth, and advances in 
technology across the globe.22
17 See G.A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity 
for Processing Information 63 Psychological Review 81, 88 (1956).
18 Sometimes known as the ‘tyranny’ or ‘paradox’ of choice, ‘choice overload’, or ‘extensive-choice 
conditions’: see B. Schwartz, Self-determination: The Tyranny Of Freedom 55 American Psychologist 
79 (2000), B. Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice (Harper Collins 2004), S. Iyengar and M. Lepper, 
When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing? 79 Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 995 (2000), and also A. Tversky and E. Shaﬁr, Choice under Conﬂict: The 
Dynamics Of Deferred Decision 3 Psychological Science 358 (1992).
19 See M. David Glen M.B. Susan and H. Jonathan, Choose, Choose, Choose, Choose, Choose, 
Choose, Choose: Emerging and Prospective Research on the Deleterious Effects of Living in Consumer 
Hyperchoice 52 Journal of Business Ethics 207 (2004) and see also J.R. Averill, Personal Control 
Over Aversive Stimuli and its Relationship to Stress (above n 7).
20 See B. Scheibehenne, R. Greifeneder and P.M. Todd, Can There Ever Be Too Many Options? 
A Meta-Analytic Review of Choice Overload (above n 5).
21 See S. Iyengar and M. Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a 
Good Thing? (above n 18) at 1003, citing de Tocqueville (“I have seen the freest and best educated of 
men in circumstances the happiest to be found in the world; yet it seemed to me that a cloud habitu-
ally hung on their brow and they seemed serious and almost sad even in their pleasures”) as well as 
B. Schwartz, The Tyranny of Choice Scientiﬁc American 71 (2004).
22 See for instance C. Anderson, The Longer Long Tail: How Endless Choice is Creating Unlimited 
Demand (above n 11).
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The third point has to do with the decision-maker’s expectations. Having a larger 
choice set appears to raise expectations of ﬁnding the perfect choice. The higher the 
decision-maker’s expectation, the greater the likelihood he will refuse to make any 
decision at all. This is since large choice sets require a lot of time and energy spent 
in evaluation and comparison, and the decision maker experiences the fear of not 
being able to come to the best possible decision.23
ii. The ‘When’ of Too Much Choice
Let us attempt to capture the gist of the discussion in the previous sub-section. In 
short, choice enables the decision-maker to be responsible for his own fate. Having 
more choice allows him to more closely determine that fate, or, in economic terms, 
achieve a pareto optimal outcome. The marginal benefit of one more alternative 
increases to a point where it levels out, and the decision-maker is indifferent to 
more choice thereafter. The price to pay for an extensive assortment is, in cognitive 
terms, where an increase in the number of alternatives concomitantly increases the 
cognitive resource needed to evaluate those alternatives, without a limit beyond 
which those costs flat line. 
Where lies this cognitive Rubicon beyond which there is no return? Are we safe 
so long as we do not attempt to ford this mental river? These are important questions 
insofar as they shed light on whether CESL will cause or exacerbate the law market’s 
overcrowding, as well as the effect on users’ behaviour as the number of available 
laws creeps towards the magic number. 
No precise answer is forthcoming, but it has been suggested that our minds can 
handle up to a ‘reasonably large, but not ecologically unusual, number of options’.24 
This has for instance been ﬂeshed out by an experiment which required respondents 
to distinguish only variance in musical notes – e.g. a ‘b ﬂat’ from an ‘f sharp’ or a ‘c 
minor’ – and which found that their performance deteriorated after accurately iden-
tifying the ﬁrst ﬁve or six tones.25 In the same way that it is a challenge for an ordinary 
person to store more than seven simple pieces of information in his short-term 
memory,26 ‘[m]ost people can handle only five to nine items before they begin to 
consistently make errors in perception’.27 As Miller suggested, the limit hovers around 
23 See S. Iyengar, R. Wells and B. Schwartz, Doing Better But Feeling Worse – Looking for the 
‘Best’ Job Undermines Satisfaction 17 Psychological Science 143 (2006) at 148 (‘…because their 
pursuit of the elusive ‘best’ induces them to consider a large number of possibilities, thereby increas-
ing their potential for regret or anticipated regret, engendering unrealistically high expectations, and 
creating mounting opportunity costs’). This is sometimes framed in terms of regret – see K. Diehl and 
C. Poynor, Great Expectations?! Assortment Size, Expectations and Satisfaction 47 Journal of Market-
ing Research 312 (2010).
24 See S. Iyengar and M. Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a 
Good Thing? (above n 18) at 996.
25 See G.A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity 
for Processing Information (above n 17).
26 See S. Iyengar, The Art. of Choosing (Little, Brown 2010).
27 See ibid. Ch. 12.
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the integer seven ‘plus minus two’28 and differs from individual to individual. This 
number is of course much smaller than twenty-four or thirty.
Clearly, decisional paralysis does not set in after the ﬁfth or seventh or ninth item. 
What is suggested from the evidence is that as decision-makers are confronted with 
an increasing number of choices beyond their limited capabilities, compounded by 
choices which have multiple attributes, they become increasingly demotivated from 
making decisions. This may also help explain the apparent correlation between, 
for instance, what is known as the status quo bias and the number of choices; 
people are unable to decide and therefore stick to their default position. Yet before 
choice overload occurs, decision-makers can and do make choices, but they do so 
only imperfectly. 
Besides the size of the assortment, the following factors affect the likelihood of 
the decision maker experiencing the negative effects of too much choice. Firstly, 
familiarity or expertise with the context or domain of choice is a relevant factor.29 
After all, familiarity made it easier for decision-makers to separate the proverbial 
wheat from the chaff. Those who were unfamiliar with the domain they were con-
fronted with preferred to have a smaller choice set and satisfaction with their choice 
decreased as the choice set grew larger.30 As Iyengar put it succinctly, ‘[t]he ultimate 
paradox might be that the only circumstances in which choosers are truly comfortable 
with extensive choices is when, because of the chooser’s previous experience, these 
choices are perceived as limited in number’.31
Secondly, akin to the point made just previously, the presence of prior preferences 
is germane. If this is absent, the decision maker cannot simply select that which 
closely aligns with his otherwise established preferences.32 Chernev had respondents 
choose either from a larger or smaller range of chocolates – twenty-four ﬂavours or 
six ﬂavours, respectively. Before choosing, one group of respondents were instructed 
to write down their preferences in terms of the attributes of each choice – i.e. texture, 
ﬂavour etc. – and to rank each attribute in terms of preference. The other group was 
not instructed to do so. The data showed that making respondents think about their 
preferences before the decision making process had a counteractive effect on choice 
overload. Indeed, those with prior preferences have been shown to prefer and enjoy 
greater satisfaction from a larger choice set.33
28 See G.A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity 
for Processing Information (above n 17).
29 See Y. Wan, S. Menon and A. Ramaprasad, The Paradoxical Nature of Electronic Decision Aids 
on Comparison-Shopping: The Experiments and Analysis 4 Journal of Theoretical and Applied Elec-
tronic Commerce Research 80 (2009).
30 See C. Mogilner, T., Rudnick and S. Iyengar, The Mere Categorisation Effect: How the Pres-
ence of Categories Increases Choosers’ Perseptions of Assortment Variety and Outcome Satisfaction 
35 Journal of Consumer Research 202 (2008).
31 See S. Iyengar and M. Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a 
Good Thing? (above n 18).
32 See ibid.
33 See A. Chernev, When More Is Less and Less Is More: The Role of Ideal Point Availability and 
Assortment in Consumer Choice 30 Journal of Consumer Research 170 (2003).
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A third factor is the absence – or presence – of a dominant alternative. Thus choice 
overload may set in if there is no one obviously dominant option and the proportion 
of non-dominant options is large. Otherwise – that is to say, if a dominant option 
exists – the choice would be clear for the decision maker regardless of the number of 
options.34
Finally, harkening back to the discussion on Miller, the similarity between choices 
has an impact on whether the decision maker experiences choice overload. Choices 
become more difﬁcult or less satisfying where the differences between the alternatives 
get smaller and where the amount of information about them increases.35 This point 
is exempliﬁed in an experiment conducted on how people in the US chose pension 
plans.36 They were required to evaluate all the possible alternatives in order to choose 
that which provided the greatest yield for a given period of time. This seems to be a 
simple enough task. Yet, on closer inspection, decision makers are faced with having 
to distinguish a large array of choices based on asset class37 and size,38 and also trade-
offs regarding risk versus returns, and immediate satisfaction versus future discom-
fort. The more complex and the greater the number of alternatives, the greater the 
strain is placed on our mental faculties to differentiate and evaluate each and every 
alternative sufﬁciently for one dominant alternative to emerge. Such being the case, 
the decision maker ﬁnds it difﬁcult to justify any one particular choice.39
In short, as regards the ‘when’ of too much choice, much depends on whether the 
decision maker is in familiar terrain and whether he has prior preferences, as well as 
the number in the choice set and how similar the alternatives are. The presence of 
these factors aggravates choice overload. The decision maker may ﬁnd a decrease in 
satisfaction with the chosen option,40 and there is likely to be a concomitant increase 
in negative emotion like disappointment and regret.41
34 See D. Dhar, Consumer Preferences for a No-Choice Option 24 Journal of Consumer Research 
215 (1997).
35 See B. Fasolo and others, Size, Entropy and Density: What Is The Difference That Makes the Dif-
ference between Small and Large Real-World Assortments? 26 Psychology and Marketing 254 (2009), 
and A. Chernev, Feature Complementarity and Assortment in Consumer Choice 31 Journal of Consumer 
Research 748 (2005).
36 See G. Huberman, S. Iyengar and W. Jiang, Deﬁned Contribution Pension Plans: Determinants of 
Participation and Contributions Rates 31 Journal of Financial Services Research 1 (2007).
37 e.g. Bonds, stock, real estate, currency or commodities.
38 This refers to the market capitalization of the asset. Although estimates differ, a ‘large-cap’ gen-
erally indicates market capitalization in the region of US$10 to 100 billion, whereas a ‘small-cap’ has 
a value of between US$100 million and US$1 billion.
39 See B. Fasolo and others, Size, Entropy and Density: What Is The Difference That Makes the Dif-
ference between Small and Large Real-World Assortments? (above n 35) and G. Huberman, S. Iyengar 
and W. Jiang, Deﬁned Contribution Pension Plans: Determinants of Participation and Contributions 
Rates (above n 36).
40 See A. Chernev, When More Is Less and Less Is More: The Role of Ideal Point Availability and 
Assortment in Consumer Choice (above n 33) and S. Iyengar and M. Lepper, When Choice is Demoti-
vating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing? (above n 18).
41 See B. Schwartz, Self-determination: The Tyranny of Freedom (above n 18).
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a. Large versus small
For reasons previously outlined, decision-makers display a preference for choice 
over a no-choice scenario. This preference may, likewise, manifest when faced with 
a choice between a larger and smaller assortment of alternatives. The discussion in 
this section highlights two salient consequences on decision-making of the prefer-
ence for larger assortments.
Firstly, while people preferred larger assortments, this had a negative effect on 
their ability to make decisions, in contrast to if they had had smaller assortments. The 
oft-cited example of this is the jam experiment. At an upmarket Californian grocer, 
Iyengar and Lepper tested whether differences in the number of choices of jam ﬂa-
vours affected consumer behaviour.42 The most common ﬂavours were omitted from 
the selections to avoid customers choosing solely or mainly on the basis of familiar-
ity. There were two separate booths, one with a selection of six jams, and the other 
with twenty-four. Of the total number of customers who passed the booths by, sta-
tistics were collected regarding the proportion that stopped to taste, how many jams 
they sampled, and how many eventually decided to purchase a jar.
The results were as follows.43 As one could imagine, more customers stopped to 
try the jams at the booth offering twenty-four jams (60% versus 40% of trafﬁc). The 
average number of jams tried at either booth was more or less similar (1.5 versus 1.4). 
However, while a third of those who stopped at the booth offering six jams purchased 
a jar, only 3% did so at the booth with twenty-four jams. To put it in relative terms, 
a four-fold difference in assortment size translated to a ten-fold difference in purchas-
ing decisions. 
Consider also the domain of investment plans.44 Huberman et al. ploughed through 
Vanguard – a company – employee data to determine the correlation between the 
number of possible investment plans and employee participation rate. They found a 
drop in participation by about 2% for every increase in ten alternatives. When there 
were only two alternative confronting employees, participation rate stood at 75%. 
When the number of alternatives touched thirty, the participation rate dropped to 70% 
and continued to drop with a rise in the number of alternatives. 
These are no one-off ﬁndings; it is one in a series of experiments on banal deci-
sions like buying pens,45 chocolates,46 and coffee,47 but also in domains like mobile 
42 See S. Iyengar and M. Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a 
Good Thing? (above n 18).
43 See ibid at 997.
44 See G. Huberman, S. Iyengar and W. Jiang, Deﬁned Contribution Pension Plans: Determinants 
of Participation and Contributions Rates (above n 36).
45 See A.M. Shah and G. Wolford, Buying Behavior as a Function of Parametric Variation of Num-
ber of Choices 18 Psychological Science 369 (2007).
46 See A. Chernev, When More Is Less and Less Is More: The Role of Ideal Point Availability and 
Assortment in Consumer Choice (above n 33).
47 See C. Mogilner, T., Rudnick and S. Iyengar, The Mere Categorisation Effect: How the Pres-
ence of Categories Increases Choosers’ Perceptions of Assortment Variety and Outcome Satisfaction 
(above n 30).
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phone contracts48 and electoral voting49 where the consequences of a wrong choice 
may be somewhat less trivial. The lesson here is straightforward – while people may 
want ever more choice, it may not be in their self-interest to cater to this preference. 
Less, in this case, is more.
Secondly, increasing the assortment size not only reduced the likelihood of making 
a decision, but also led to simpler or risk-averse choices being made. In studies on 
investment plan decisions,50 it was found that decision makers were willing to select 
the more complex alternative when the choice set was small, but were unwilling to 
do so when the choice set was large. The relatively uninformed decision-maker 
decided he was better off choosing the simpler option in a large set of choices in order 
to avoid the risk of picking an inappropriate product, and therefore eliminating from 
consideration the biggest and most complex category of choices before them, even 
though statistics demonstrated that stock investments tended to give better returns 
relative to other forms of investment. Such decision makers thus take steps to avoid 
being presented with choice overload. 
This ﬁnding echoes earlier work by Grethner et al.,51 who labelled such behaviour 
as ‘satisﬁcing’, and also subsequently by Scheibehenne.52 The term itself was coined 
by Herbert Simon to denote behaviour undertaken to reduce cognitive load to a man-
ageable level.53 In so doing, the decision maker runs the risk of coming to a sub-
optimal decision, but is willing to accept a choice which is both satisfactory and 
sufﬁcient (thus the portmanteau ‘satisﬁce’). The lesson learnt is that ‘a larger choice 
set increases the appeal of simple, easy-to-understand, options’.54
b. An overcrowded law market?
The preceding discussion highlights the possible problems for the decision-maker 
of having too much choice. Let us now consider these problems for the firm – the 
veritable decision-maker in the market for contract laws. Does CESL lead to infor-
mation or choice overload in the market, as some have already suggested?55 Let us 
48 See A. Ayal, Harmful Freedom of Choice: Lessons from the Cellphone Market 74 Law and Con-
temporary Problems 91 (2011).
49 For an overview, see N. Augenblick and S. Nicholson, Ballot Position, Choice Fatigue, and Voter 
Behaviour Working Paper, Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley (2011).
50 See G. Huberman, S. Iyengar and W. Jiang, Deﬁned Contribution Pension Plans: Determinants 
of Participation and Contributions Rates (above n 36).
51 See D. Grethner, A. Schwartz and L.L. Wilde, The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Anal-
ysis of Search and Disclosure 59 Southern California Law Review 277 (1987).
52 See See B. Scheibehenne, R. Greifeneder and P.M. Todd, Can There Ever Be Too Many Options? 
A Meta-Analytic Review of Choice Overload (above n 5) at 420 (“[S]ingle studies in our meta-analysis 
that formally tested maximizing in a context of choice overload could not establish it as a moderator”.).
53 See S. Iyengar and E. Kamenica, Choice Proliferation, Simplicity Seeking and Asset Allocation 
94 Journal of Public Economics 530 (2011).
54 Ibid.
55 See V. Mak, Policy Choices in European Consumer Law: Regulation through ‘Targeted Dif-
ferentiation’ (above n 4).
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deal with each of the previously mentioned factors that contribute to this phenom-
enon.
Firstly, let us consider the numbers. There are at present twenty-seven Member 
States, each with their own set of contract laws. This number does not include can-
didate countries like Croatia, or sub-national systems like Scots law. It also does not 
include anational rules like the Unidroit Principles56 or the Principles of European 
Contract Law.57 One is not limited to any of these rules, since Art. 3 of the Rome 
Regulation58 entitles ﬁrms to choose, subject of course to certain limitations,59 any 
one of the more than hundred national laws on offer in any part of the globe. 
Clearly one does not have to add up the number of alternatives in the market for 
contract laws to know that this number is ‘ecologically unusual’, to use Iyengar and 
Lepper’s phrase. This fact remains even without CESL’s inclusion. The suggestion 
that CESL leads to choice overload is therefore speculative at best. Caution has to be 
exercised when attempting to translate insights from one discipline in one domain to 
another discipline in another domain, especially since much depends inter alia on the 
cognitive capacity of the decision-maker and the type of product(s) being considered.60
That having been said, and as mentioned previously, having so many choices 
requires investing a lot of time and energy to evaluate and compare them all. The 
prospect of having to do so – or, more precisely, not being able to do so – may induce 
a degree of fear of not being able make the best possible choice, failing to fulﬁl one’s 
expectations, and giving rise to regret. If ﬁrms are confronted with this many alterna-
tives in the law market, overload may already be manifest. If so, ﬁrms may not opt 
in to CESL. As the number of choices increase, ﬁrms may be expected to choose laws 
which are less complex and easier to understand and apply. This may work against 
the attractiveness of CESL in view of its novel character, and especially if it is seen 
as complex and difﬁcult to understand or apply.61 If they experience choice overload, 
they may abdicate the decision-making entirely, and not choose any law at all. They 
therefore simply stick to their current choice of governing law. As mentioned above, 
56 Unitroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2010, available at http://www.unidroit.
org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm.
57 H. Kotz and A. Flessner European Contract Law Vol 1: Formation, Validity and Content of Con-
tracts; Contracts and Third Parties (Trans. Tony Weir) (Clarendon Press 1997).
58 Regulation (EC) No 59/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on 
the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) L 177/6.
59 In terms of consumer contracts, the mandatory rules of the consumer’s habitual residence are 
applicable (Art. 6 Rome Regulation). Furthermore, a choice of law cannot override international public 
policy – see C-381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc [2000] ECR I-9305.
60 See for instance G. Loewenstein, Experimental Economics from the Vantage-Point of Behavioural 
Economics 109 The Economic Journal 25 (1999), and A. Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral 
Analysis of Law 4 Haifa Law Review 237 (2008).
61 See for instance G. Ruhl, The Common European Sales Law: 28th Regime, 2nd Regime or 1st 
Regime? 19(1) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 148 (2012); Which? Brieﬁng, 
Common European Sales Law: Legal Uncertainty and Complexity Galore (April 2012), accessed at 
http://www.which.co.uk/documents/pdf/common-european-sales-law-which-brieﬁng-293645.pdf; Euro-
chambres position paper on CESL (October 2012), accessed at http://www.eurochambres.be/objects/1/
Files/EUROCHAMBRES_position_on_Common_%20European_Sales_Law.pdf.
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increasing the number in choice sets reinforces default positions.62 It should however 
be stated that there is no hard evidence for this conclusion, as no ﬁeld or laboratory 
study has yet been conducted on the impact of the number of choices for the market 
for contract laws. 
Secondly, let us be clear that the effect on cognitive load of choices in the law 
market is not simply that of a numbers game; one must also consider how familiar 
ﬁrms are with the law market and the choices therein. There are different shades of 
familiarity and one may surmise that different ﬁrms fall into different shades. Multi-
national ﬁrms with a history of choosing different laws might ﬁnd this a well-known 
domain and therefore not struggle with the choices available. Smaller ﬁrms, on the 
other hand, might not. Also, the ﬁrms may not be familiar with all the choices avail-
able, but only those they already – frequently – use or have been exposed to.63 This 
may explain why, perhaps due to the overcrowding of the law market, studies on the 
use of international contract law instruments like the Vienna Sales Convention 
(CISG)64 and the Unidroit Principles show historical low usage or exclusion of these 
instruments in standard form contracting.65 A more recent study backed the trend 
however, showing increased usage of these instruments.66 This may suggest increas-
ing familiarity of and/or preference – see below – for the CISG or the Unidroit Prin-
ciples, as the case may be.
Thirdly, do ﬁrms have prior preferences on choice of law? If so, then the vast 
number of choices may be irrelevant since ﬁrms will strive to pick this prior prefer-
ence. As far as prior preferences are concerned, in the market for contract laws, there 
may be a ‘homeward trend’ for ﬁrms choosing their domestic law. This is unsurpris-
ing, especially as this law tends to be that which law ﬁrms are most familiar with. 
This is presumably since legal counsel would have been trained in their home coun-
try and in that national legal system. However, unlike domains involving consumer 
62 See for example W. Samuelson and R. Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making 1 Journal 
of Risk and Uncertainty 7 (1988), D. Kahneman, J. Knetsch and R.H. Thaler., Anomalies: The Endow-
ment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias 5 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 193 (1991), 
and A. Kempf and S. Ruenzi, Status Quo Bias and the Number of Alternatives: An Empirical Illustration 
from the Mutual Fund Industry CFR working Paper No 05–07 (2005).
63 See G. Low, Will Firms Choose a European Optional Instrument in Contract Law? 33 European 
Journal of Law and Economics 521 (2012).
64 The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980, available 
at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm.
65 See for instance M.W. Gordon, Some Thoughts on the Receptiveness of Contract Rules in the 
CISG and UNIDROIT Principles as Reﬂected in One’s State (Florida) Experience of (1) Law School 
Faculty, (2) Members of the Bar with an International Practice, and (3) Judges 46 American Journal 
of Comparative Law (Supplement) 361 (1998) and K.P. Berger and others, The CENTRAL Enquiry on 
the Use of Transnational Law in International Contract Law and Arbitration – Background, Procedure 
and Selected Results in K.P. Berger (ed.), The Practice of Transnational Law (Kluwer Law Interna-
tional 2000).
66 See P.L. Fitzgerald, The International Contracting Practices Survey Project: An Empirical Study 
of the Value and Utility of the United Nation’s Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 
and the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts to Practitioners, Jurists, and Legal 
Academics in the United States 27 Journal of Law and Commerce 1 (2008).
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products, merely having prior preferences in a law market does not mean that such 
preferences can be automatically satisﬁed – though a ﬁrm with bargaining clout 
should come close to this. This is since, unlike a simple purchase, all parties to a com-
mercial contract need to consent to that choice before it can be made. This is not to 
say that such ﬁrms will ﬁnd themselves in unfamiliar territory in an overcrowded law 
market, since negotiations as between parties tend to bring to the fore speciﬁc alterna-
tives for detailed consideration, rather than the entire menu at hand.
The fourth point is as regards the similarity between choices. To reiterate, decision-
making becomes more challenging when the attributes of the alternatives are similar. 
The difﬁculty of distinguishing between and comparing alternatives is compounded 
as the alternatives become more complex, as shown in the earlier example of choos-
ing pension plans. This makes justifying any particular choice burdensome. 
Let us take the example of pre-contractual negotiations. In this case, the common 
law may be easily distinguished from the rest of the European continent in that there 
is no obligation to negotiate in good faith, and the courtship may be terminated prior 
to matrimony without any adverse consequences. The trickier task is distinguishing 
amongst the civilian alternatives. Clearly the major civil law jurisdictions impose an 
obligation to negotiate in good faith. Unless one knows where to look, however, one 
may not detect the subtle differences that arise as regards the timing and circum-
stances for which a duty can be implied or whether such duty is contractual or tortious. 
French, German and Dutch law all differ in these respects.67
Another example is the duty to mitigate damages for breach of contract. This duty 
is recognised in the common law and also in civilian systems like Germany, the Neth-
erlands, Italy and Austria.68 One may be tempted to say that the French system does 
not recognise the duty to mitigate, but a French scholar will immediately say that the 
principle of faute de la victime achieves the same function.69 Again, subtle differences 
arise, though with fundamental consequences. Thus in some jurisdictions, the con-
tractual duty to mitigate is linked to the more venerable notion of contributory neg-
ligence, the latter of which can be traced to Roman law.70 What this means is that, 
depending on the choice of law, the failure to mitigate either reduces the quantum of 
67 See for instance C. Bollen, Enforcement of the Duty to Carry On Negotiations: (Should it be) a 
Possibility in Europe or Not? in J. Smits, D. Haas and G. Hesen (eds), Speciﬁc Performance in Contract 
Law: National and Other Perspectives (Intersentia 2008).
68 C. Goetz and R.E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Towards a General Theory of Contractual 
Obligation 69 Virginia Law Review 967 (1983).
69 See F. Cafaggi, Creditors Fault: In Search of a Comparative Frame in O. Ben-Shahar and 
A. Porat (eds), Fault in American Contract Law 244 (Cambridge University Press 2010).
70 See A. Keirse, Why the Proposed Optional Common European Sales Law has not but Should have 
Abandoned the Principle of All or Nothing 19 European Review of Private Law 951, 955–960 (2011) 
at (In that case, a debtor is fully exempt from liability for damages if the creditor contributed to those 
damages: the creditor’s omission is seen as breaking the chain of causation. The harshness of this rule 
was tempered ﬁrst in s 1304 of the Austrian ABGB of 1811, which only partially exempted the debtor 
liability to the extent of the creditor’s failure to mitigate. Following with which jurisdictions like Ger-
many, Belgium and the Netherlands switched statutorily or via judge-made law from an all-or-nothing 
approach to a contributory negligence rule).
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damages or negates the right to damages entirely. How many parties to a contract are 
aware of this? How could they be expected ﬁnd out?
This brings us neatly to the next point – expertise. How does one attempt – or 
expect – users to differentiate the various legal systems on the basis of all their attri-
butes or the way they regulate speciﬁc aspects of the contract. As shown above during 
the discussion on pre-contractual negotiation and mitigation, the rules and their excep-
tions may be very similar or vastly different depending on the jurisdictions investi-
gated. So too, one might add, regarding the manner in which these rules are applied. 
And, we are only talking about two small – albeit important – aspects of the law of 
contract, namely negotiation and remedies – what of the rules on formation or incor-
poration of terms or interpretation? Furthermore, what criteria might be used to 
evaluate and distinguish a complex product like the law? Entire manuscripts have 
been written and decades of man-hours devoted – by experts, no less – on the com-
parative endeavour. Now imagine a layperson trying to decide on a governing law, 
having not only to evaluate these similarities and differences, but also those of other 
aspects of the various alternatives. A layperson might throw his hands in the air and 
give up, or not detect differences a comparatist knows like the back of his palm. One 
cannot simply ﬂood the market for contract laws and expect users to be fully equipped 
with the time, energy and expertise to apply the functional comparative method.
An educated guess has over 90% of users in the law market as laypersons, since 
this is the percentage of SMEs active in the Union, and smaller ﬁrms might not employ 
in-house counsel or instruct lawyers to advise them on matters pertaining to contracts. 
This is of course not always true, and it certainly is not true for larger ﬁrms which 
most likely have their own experts, in-house or otherwise. Yet even for the so-called 
experts, one may question whether they have the expertise to properly evaluate the 
assortment of laws before them. The vast majority of lawyers are equipped with a 
national legal education, and while comparative law courses abound, participation is 
not mandatory in any jurisdiction. Thus in the same way the methodology of the recent 
pan-European Draft Common Frame of Reference has been criticised as nationalistic,71 
one might say the same with the way nationally-trained lawyers choose governing 
laws.
Fifth, even if some within the assortment are similar, is there an alternative that 
dominates the market for laws? ‘English law’ would probably be on the lips of the 
former Justice Secretary72 as would ‘German law’ be on those of the Bundesminis-
71 See J. Smits, The Draft Common Frame of Reference, Methodological Nationalism and the Way 
Forward (2009) 4 European Review of Contract Law 270 and G. Dannemann, In Search of System 
Neutrality: Methodological Issues in the Drafting of European Contract Law Rules in M. Adams and 
J. Bomhoff (eds), Practice and Theory in Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) <http://
ebooks.cambridge.org/chapter.jsf?bid=CBO9780511863301&cid=CBO9780511863301A012>.
72 See England and Wales: The Jurisdiction of Choice. Accessed at http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/
documents/downloads/jurisdiction_of_choice_brochure.pdf. See also the recent survey on international 
arbitration by Queen Mary University in which 40% of respondents indicated their preference for Eng-
lish law, followed by 17% for New York law – http://www.whitecase.com/ﬁles/upload/ﬁleRepository/
2010International_Arbitration_Survey_Choices_in_International_Arbitration.pdf.
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terin.73 Commissioner Reding or Wallis MEP might disagree, calling CESL the new 
gold standard for contracting across the Single Market. As Collins has said, ‘without 
powerful incentives … the English will not relinquish the common law, nor the French 
the code Napoleon, nor the Germans the BGB’.74 Without expressing any views on 
the correctness of any of these views, it is quite possible that certain ﬁrms may view 
(a) certain law(s) as dominant over the other alternatives. For these ﬁrms, all these 
other alternatives are irrelevant and therefore do not contribute towards choice over-
load.
The sixth point is as regards the complexity of legal products. Depending on the 
intensity of the exercise, one may argue that distinguishing legal systems is by no 
means a simple task. Legal systems are complex; and scholars have taken pains to 
demonstrate their complexity descriptively, theoretically, mathematically, and empir-
ically.75 The Pandectists were on a fool’s errand – legal systems simply cannot be 
simpliﬁed.76 Most studies on complexity focus on American – common – law, though 
comparatists on the Continent have lamented the complexity of their legal system as 
exacerbated by its interconnectedness with various transnational legal orders.77
If laws are indeed irreducibly complex, and some are more complex than others, 
then one may expect ﬁrms to satisﬁce by choosing relatively simpler laws when faced 
with a large assortment in the market. This is done, as mentioned, to avoid the risk 
of picking something inappropriate simply because it does not understand fully the 
consequences of its actions. As the study on pension investment showed, more com-
plex products were systematically excluded from consideration in favour of simpler 
products. In the legal domain, a ﬁrm might ﬁnd products which are easier to predict 
easier to understand, swapping an understanding of the intimate workings of each 
legal system for its practical application to the realities of contracting. After all, legal 
certainty is one of the aspects of legal rules sought after by commerce. Which sets of 
rules are more legally certain is an important question that may be posed, though one 
which is beyond the remit of this discussion. 
73 See www.lawmadeingermany.de.
74 See H. Collins, in L. Gormley and J. Shaw (eds), The European Civil Code: The Way Forward, 
25 (Cambridge University Press 2008).
75 See for instance S. Long and J. Swingen, An Approach to the Measurement of Tax Law Com-
plexity Journal of the American Taxation Association 22 (1987), P. Schuck , Legal Complexity: Some 
Causes, Consequences, and Cures 42 Duke Law Journal 52 (1992), M.J. White, Legal Complexity and 
Lawyers’ Beneﬁt from Litigation 12 International Review of Law and Economics 381 (1992), L. Kaplow, 
A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules 11 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 
150 (1995), E. Kades, The Law of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The Implication of Com-
putational Complexity Theory for the Law 43 Rutgers Law Review 403 (1997), and R. Epstein, The 
Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules (University of Chicago Law and Economics Olin Working Papers 
Series 2004).
76 R.G. Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity: An Explanation of Why the Law Can’t Just Be Less 
Complex 27 Florida State University Law Review 715 (2000).
77 See for instance J. Smits, The Complexity of Transnational Law: Coherence and Fragmentation 
of Private Law 14 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law (2010), and other national reports to the 18th 
International Congress of Comparative Law in Washington DC (2010).
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Furthermore, previous work on ﬁrms in this area suggests that they searched for 
alternatives in a localised or idiosyncratic manner, extending the search only when a 
suitable alternative was not found. They also evaluated such alternatives in a sequen-
tial manner, discarding unsuitable ones as they went along the search.78 Unfamiliar 
and non-territorial products are those that are lined up for the guillotine ﬁrst.79 It is 
therefore likely that such decision-makers avoided information and choice overload 
by keeping their assortment of legal alternatives to within cognitively manageable 
limits – i.e. hovering around that magic number seven. 
Thus far, we know that there are an ‘ecologically unusual’ number of alternatives 
in the law market, and that the products on offer are complex. Also, some ﬁrms may 
be familiar with the law market, or have prior preferences entering the market; and 
some products may appear dominant over others. It is not unreasonable to assume 
that other ﬁrms may not be (as) familiar, or not have any clear preferences. Further-
more, one may doubt the expertise of some ﬁrms to be willing and able to fully 
evaluate complex products like legal rules. Furthermore, ﬁrms may be predicted to 
reduce their criteria for choosing and settle on a simpler basis.
What this means is that there will be ﬁrms who are comfortable navigating their 
way through the maze of legal rules to select that which best fulﬁls their preferences, 
and others whose head remains above the proverbial water for a variety of reasons 
– e.g. satisﬁcing –80 and yet others who may be confronted with extensive choice 
conditions. In other words, possibly some, but deﬁnitely not all, ﬁrms suffer from 
information or choice overload. Furthermore, if the best possible alternative is not 
chosen, but instead the satisfactory alternative, or that which is simpler to understand, 
or decision-making is abdicated entirely, then the contract law market in Europe is 
not competitive. In turn, introducing CESL might not lead to improvement or innova-
tion in any of the legal products currently on offer.81
iii. The Way Forward for the Market for Contract Law
The number of choices and the nature of Europe’s market for contract laws thus 
suggest that its users might experience overload. The costs of the large assortment 
thus may outweigh its benefits. Research in the field advocates the following two 
strategies to minimise these costs and facilitate optimal decision-making: (i) reduce 
the number of choices; (ii) structuring the decision-making process.
78 See G. Low, Will Firms Choose a European Optional Instrument in Contract Law? (above n 63).
79 Ibid.
80 On the other hand, see D. Grethner, A. Schwartz and L.L. Wilde, The Irrelevance of Information 
Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure (above n 51) (which rejects the need for regulation of 
information on the basis that decision makers satisﬁce and thus avoid information overload).
81 G. Low, Sticky Votes: Implications for a Regulatory Competitive Market for Contract Law 
(ETHYRN Conference on Europeanisation of Law, June 2010, available on request).
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a. Reduce the number of choices
A. Less is more
The first strategy is to reduce the size of the assortment to a number that users in 
the market for contract law can handle. In the early 1990s, Proctor and Gamble 
reduced the variety of shampoos it had on the market by half, and profited with a 
five per cent increase in market share. It paved the way for food and cosmetic firms 
to do the same.82 Yet evidence subsequent to Proctor and Gamble’s success is 
ambivalent about the effect of reducing the number of choices. Some studies 
showed marginal changes.83 Others, conversely, pointed to a decrease in sales.84 
These latter studies cautioned that reducing clutter increased sales because it made 
choosing easier, whilst deep cuts hit the bottom line presumably because attractive 
alternatives were removed. A ‘pragmatic’ approach to reducing choices is 
advocated,85 doing so only where the number of choices are large, the choices are 
largely undifferentiated, and they do not target a clearly identified need in the 
market.
B. Can this work within the EU?
Should the number of laws within the Union be reduced? While the numbers are 
large, it needs to be borne in mind that not all firms are overloaded by this fact. 
As pointed out earlier, through their decision-making process, firms may already 
be automatically excluding certain types of laws from consideration. If this is so, 
then for these firms, the cognitive load is being reduced to manageable levels. 
Furthermore, it is not entirely accurate to say that contract laws are largely undif-
ferentiated. Clear differences exist between common and civil law systems, and 
lengthy tomes explain the similarities and differences between and within these sys-
tems. Some of these laws, like those of England and Germany, do espouse to target 
the commercial user, though other jurisdictions remain silent as to whether they have 
identiﬁed and are exploiting a particular need in the market. The argument for reduc-
ing the number of laws is therefore one that remains to be made.
Even if such a case can be established, it is not a straightforward matter to translate 
the above insight within the law market. A company can simply and unilaterally 
remove some of its brands or products, but to consign English or German or Czech 
contract law to the dustbins of legal history, there are legal hurdles to be crossed. In 
82 “Make it Simple”, Business Week, 9 September 1996. Accessed at http://www.businessweek.
com/1996/37/b34921.htm. See also P. Boatwright and J. Nunes, Reducing Assortment: An Attribute-
Based Approach 65 Journal of Marketing 50 (2001) (54% reduction in product range of an online 
grocer increased sales by 11%).
83 See L. Sloot, D. Fok and P. Verhoef, The Short and Long Term Impact of an Assortment Reduc-
tion on Category Sales 43 Journal of Marketing Research 536 (2006) (showing that a reduction in choice 
lost a retailer existing customers, but saw a rise in new customers).
84 See P. Boatwright and J. Nunes, Reducing Assortment: An Attribute-Based Approach (above 
n 82).
85 See ibid at 60.
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the event that doing so would entail action at the European level, these hurdles include 
ﬁnding an appropriate legal basis and satisfying the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality as well as discharging their concomitant evidential burdens.86
Additionally, it may be politically unpalatable to remove any one of the panoply 
of laws readily available. As then-MEP Diana Wallis remarked soon after the Dutch 
rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, ‘[I]t is hardly the time to be seen to be moving 
towards anything that remotely resembles a European Civil Code; if the voters of 
Europe did not want a constitution it is hardly the moment to force a civil code, even 
just a contract code on them’.87 How many of the laws ought to be removed? Which 
of these laws should face the guillotine? Who would beneﬁt from a reduction of the 
number of contract laws in the market? These are politically sensitive questions that 
need to be explored if reduction is to be considered a viable strategy.
Alternatively, harmonization of these rules may be a way of reducing the informa-
tion and cognitive load for users to compare different rules. This is true if harmoniza-
tion obviates the need to compare those rules, whose substance is for all intents and 
purposes identical, or similar enough. 
That being said, if minimum harmonization is the standard imposed, then to the 
extent that differences – continue to – exist, a cross national comparison may still be 
required. Just taking consumer law, the differences that resulted from a long standing 
policy of minimum harmonization are legion, and have made proper comparison a 
complex challenge to be undertaken only by experts.88 Conversely, maximum har-
monization is politically contentious, as shown by the difﬁcult passage of the 2011 
Consumer Rights Directive.89
Finally, even if maximum harmonization would be possible, some authors have 
– and, with respect, rightly so – pointed out that the application of identical rules in 
different legal systems may lead to different results due to differences that surface 
when it comes to the interpretation and application of those rules in the twenty-seven 
Member States.90 Complexity, thus, might not be simply eliminated with a brush 
stroke.
86 For the constitutional issues, see for instance S. Weatherill, Reﬂections on the EC’s Competence to 
Develop a ‘European Contract Law’ 13 European Review of Private Law 405 (2005), and K. Gutman, 
The Commission’s 2010 Green Paper on European Contract Law: Reﬂections on Union Competence 
in Light of the Proposed Options European Review of Contract Law 151 (2011). For an examination 
of the evidential burden, see for instance G. Low, Hoe evidence-based is het Europese beleid op het 
vlak van privaatrecht? Een case study van het Gemeenschappelijk Europees Kooprecht in W.H. van 
Boom, I. Giesen and A. Verheij (eds), Privaatrecht en Gedrag (2 edn, Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2013 
(forthcoming)).
87 D. Wallis, European Contract Law – The Way Forward: Political Context, Parliament’s Preoc-
cupation and Process 7 ERA Forum 8 (2006).
88 See H. Schulte-Nolke, C. Twigg-Flesner and M. Ebers (eds), EC Consumer Law Compendium 
(Sellier European Law Publishers 2008).
89 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on 
Consumer Rights L 304/64 OJ 22.11.2011.
90 See V. Mak, Policy Choices in European Consumer Law: Regulation through ‘Targeted Differ-
entiation’ (above n 4) and V. Mak, A Shift in Focus: Systematisation in European Private Law through 
EU Law 17 European Law Journal 403 (2011).
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b. Streamlining the decision-making process
A. Articulation and categorisation
For the most part, the reason why larger assortments put people off decision-mak-
ing is because these same people are not equipped to process the sheer amount of 
information that comes with such a huge array of choices. As we have shown, 
information and choice overload do not affect all people – those who are more 
familiar with the domain of choice, the attributes of the available choices, and the 
relative benefits and costs of each choice, are less likely to be overwhelmed. The 
lack of prior preferences and the inability to distinguish between alternatives based 
on preferences, and/or their attributes, contribute to information and choice over-
load. This makes sense since people cannot choose if they have no idea what 
outcome they would like or even how to compare.
The way forward is therefore to help users in the law market choose from the large 
array of choices by rendering decision making easier. This is done by, ﬁrstly, helping 
users articulate their preferences beforehand; and, secondly, to categorise the deci-
sion-making process. Rationalisation as a strategy becomes more attractive where 
there is a high risk of information and choice overload. This is apparent where the 
users are unfamiliar with the products on offer, the assortment size is large and the 
products themselves are complex – these may be characteristics of the law market. 
Before proceeding further with the discussion, it should be said that this strategy can 
be applied as an alternative to, or in conjunction with, a reduction in the number of 
choices. 
The ﬁrst point is a straightforward solution to an identiﬁed cause of informational 
and choice overload. This can be explained with reference to the previously discussed 
experiment on chocolates.91 Respondents were divided into two groups and asked 
respectively to choose from twenty-four or six assortments of chocolate. Before the 
experiment started, one group was asked to write down their preferences for each of 
the attributes of the chocolates – e.g. taste, texture, nut content – and also to rank each 
attribute in terms of importance. The other group was not made to consider and rank 
its preferences. After both groups had chosen their chocolate, they were given a 
chance to reafﬁrm their decision or change their mind and switch to the most popular 
chocolate chosen by the group The thinking behind giving respondents a second 
chance is that those who have stronger preferences are more likely to be more conﬁ-
dent about their choices and therefore less likely to change their minds.92 
The results afﬁrmed the above-mentioned key features of information and choice 
overload. Those who were not prompted to think about their preferences prior to 
decision-making were less likely to change their mind where the assortment size was 
small (9%). This increased more than four-fold (38%) when confronted with a larger 
91 A. Chernev, When More Is Less and Less Is More: The Role of Ideal Point Availability and 
Assortment in Consumer Choice (above n 33).
92 Ibid at 173.
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assortment size.93 The conclusion, therefore, is that by articulating preferences prior 
to decision-making, the effects of larger assortments are attenuated, and users become 
more conﬁdent in assessing the available alternatives and coming to an acceptable 
decision. 
The second point is about ameliorating information and choice overload in deci-
sion-making by categorising the available alternatives. Whether for simple or complex 
alternatives,94 categorisation has two beneﬁcial effects on reducing the cognitive load 
of comparing and choosing: it acts as a signal to users about the similarity of alterna-
tives within that category and differences viz. other categories; and users are limited 
to the consideration of only those alternatives in the category at any one moment in 
time, rather than the entire assortment.95 Categorisation facilitates users’ consideration 
of larger assortments, and therefore makes it more likely that users act rather than 
give up choosing form the assortment altogether.96 
How should one categorise? Taking a cue from the ﬁnancial products market, 
alternatives may be categorised according to certain attributes or outcomes. The util-
ity of these different types of categorisation is dependent on whether the user is 
familiar with the domain or suffers from a lack of conﬁdence. Categorisation based 
on attributes beneﬁts users already familiar with the domain, since doing so helps 
them compare relevant features across the assortment range. On the other hand, the 
user lacking in conﬁdence might beneﬁt from outcome-based categorisation as he is 
ill-equipped to make a comprehensive attribute comparison, and may end up focusing 
on what the consequences of each choice are.97
Separately, the size of each category and the sequence in which they are considered 
both have an impact on users’ cognitive load. In an experiment on buyers of Audi 
cars in Germany, Levav et al. found that the sequence of decisions on the way in 
93 Ibid at 174.
94 See C. Mogilner, T. Rudnick and S. Iyengar, The Mere Categorisation Effect: How the Pres-
ence of Categories Increases Choosers’ Perceptions of Assortment Variety and Outcome Satisfaction 
(above n 30) for the argument that the ‘mere’ act of categorization helps, regardless of the nature of the 
alternative. This is corroborated by T. Langner and M. Krengel, Reducing Choice Conﬂict for Complex 
Products through Categorisation III Advances in Advertising Research 43 (2012) (true for complex 
products where consumers act rationally rather than emotionally).
95 See C. Mogilner, T. Rudnick and S. Iyengar, The Mere Categorisation Effect: How the Pres-
ence of Categories Increases Choosers’ Perceptions of Assortment Variety and Outcome Satisfaction 
(above n 30) at 203.
96 Scheibehenne notes that categorization (or the lack thereof) may be a contributing factor for 
choice overload, but, in the same breath, cautions that this may not be a sufﬁcient condition since ‘most 
of the studies … that did not ﬁnd [choice overload] also did not categorise the options’ (B. Scheibe-
henne, R. Greifeneder and P.M. Todd, Can There Ever Be Too Many Options? A Meta-Analytic Review 
of Choice Overload (above n 5) at 419). See however A. Chernev, U. Bockenholt and J. Goodman, 
Commentary on Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd – Choice Overload: Is There Anything to It? 37 
Journal of Consumer Research 426 (2010) for the view that Scheibehenne is incorrect about the suf-
ﬁciency of conditions for choice overload.
97 See A. Chernev, The Psychology of Choice Overload: Implications for Retail Financial Services 
Filene Research Institute (2011) at 11.
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which the car was customised affected the outcome of those decisions.98 There were 
a total of 144 options for car customisation spread across eight categories. The cat-
egories ranged from the type of upholstery for the seats to the colour of the chassis. 
The number of options within each category varied between four and ﬁfty-six. Buy-
ers were randomly split into “Hi-Lo” and “Lo-Hi” groups in terms of the sequence 
of their decision-making process. The “Hi-Lo” group had to decide categories with 
a decreasing number of options, and the reverse was true for the “Lo-Hi” group 
It was found that the “Hi-Lo” group were more likely to stick to the default options, 
and, in consequence, spent on average €1500 more than the “Lo-Hi” group The rea-
son for this behaviour was attributable to the customers in the “Hi-Lo” group being 
subjected to mental strain early in the decision-making process, which resulted in 
them being less motivated to make active choices as they were confronted with yet 
more decisions to make. Several other studies afﬁrm the effect categorisation has on 
mediating the problem of overload.99 
Choice overload – and its allied information overload – can therefore be overcome 
by ‘nudging’ the decision-maker forward in baby steps. This is so he does not feel 
overwhelmed. To turn the metaphor on its head, one must lose the forest for its trees. 
The gist of things is to make the evaluation of alternatives progressive, by grouping 
or categorizing alternatives, and thereby decreasing the mental burden for the deci-
sion maker, especially in situations of complexity and unfamiliarity. 
B. Comparing contract laws – a thought experiment
Is the market for contract laws easily amenable to the above-mentioned strategy 
for reducing cognitive load? It is not uncommon for end users to be prompted to 
think about their preferences prior to considering any of the alternatives. Estate 
agents often ask prospective home owners to think about what they look for in a 
home – for instance, whether it is for quiet retirement or a yuppie lifestyle, the type 
of neighbourhood – or neighbours – or the types of furnishings. The same might 
also be true of cars – does speed matter? Or space? Is it meant to be a status sym-
bol or to ferry children to their schools? In the same way, users who are aware not 
only of their preferences but also how those preferences rank, are more confident 
in choosing in the overcrowded law market.
98 See J. Levav and others, The Effect of Attribute Order and Variety on Choice Demotivation: 
A Field Experiment on German Car Buyers in G. Fitzsimons and V. Morwitz (eds), Advances in Con-
sumer Research Vol 34 (2007).
99 See for instance C. Mogilner, T. Rudnick and S. Iyengar, The Mere Categorisation Effect: How 
the Presence of Categories Increases Choosers’ Perseptions of Assortment Variety and Outcome Satis-
faction (above n 30), and K. Diehl, When Two Rights Make a Wrong: Searching Too Much in Ordered 
Environments 42 Journal of Marketing Research 313 (2005). However, whether non-categorisation 
is itself a sufﬁcient condition for choice overload has recently been doubted – see B. Scheibehenne, 
R. Greifeneder and P.M. Todd, Can There Ever Be Too Many Options? A Meta-Analytic Review of 
Choice Overload. (above n 5). That having been said, whether non-categorization is a condition for 
choice overload is of course distinct from the point that categorization helps ameliorate its effects.
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In-house counsel or instructed lawyers ought therefore to encourage their clients 
to think about their preferences for applicable law, just like in the previous example 
of estate agents prompting potential home owners to think about the qualities of their 
dream property. The more difﬁcult question is how to get laypersons who do not have 
recourse to legal counsel to think about these things. Also, it ought to be a simple task 
to categorise laws, especially as that role has been ﬁlled and practised to perfection 
for almost two centuries by comparative lawyers.100
At ﬁrst glance, therefore, the market for contract laws appears amenable to the 
above-mentioned strategy for reducing cognitive load. This is especially so since 
innovations in technology are now available to assist us in making market-related 
decisions, whether they be related to laws or not. Websites abound with information 
to help us compare the different characteristics of, say, Philips’ Sonicare Diamond-
head from Braun’s Triumph Professional.101 There are already calls for the same to 
be applied to the law market, arguing that ‘[a]n interactive website combined with a 
ranking of the various available options … would … empower the consumer to make 
an informed choice … of CESL and of national jurisdictions’.102 Such a step ought to 
be encouraged, especially since collating all the relevant information in a one-stop 
shop reduces search costs, and categorising laws further lessens the burden for would-
be decision-makers.103 Also, whereas legal counsel may omit to ask their clients to 
think about forming prior preferences, this risk is obviated by automated tasking on 
comparison websites.
Furthermore, users may be encouraged to pick and choose their preferred part of 
different laws to customise an applicable law in the same way respondents in the Audi 
experiment chose different colours or upholstery for their prospective cars. It is true 
that legal customisation is nothing new: dépeçage is after all a principle and practice 
recognised inter alia by Art. 3 of the Rome Regulation. Yet customisation of laws is 
a highly complex task, and which is therefore not recommended for those who do not 
have the relevant information to grasp its consequences. Comparison websites may 
100 See W. Hug, The History of Comparative Law 45 Harvard Law Review 1027 (1932).
101 These are established brands of electric toothbrushes.
102 See J. Smits, Party Choice and the Common European Sales Law, or: How to Prevent the CESL 
from Becoming a Lemon on the Law Market 50 Common Market Law Review 51 (2013).
 It is of course a separate question than who would be responsible to run this programme. The 
Commission has in the past considered running a website where standard terms and conditions would 
be developed or where exchanges of information on various standard terms and conditions could be 
facilitated between stakeholders. It, however, declined further action due inter alia to perceived costs 
and beneﬁts of the venture. See European Commission, ‘European Contract Law and the Revision of 
the Acquis: The Way Forward’ (Communication) COM (2004) 651 ﬁnal and European Commission, 
First Annual Progress Report on European Contract Law and the Acquis Review COM (2005) 456 ﬁnal.
103 It is of course a separate question than who would be responsible to run this programme. The 
Commission has in the past considered running a website where standard terms and conditions would 
be developed or where exchanges of information on various standard terms and conditions could be 
facilitated between stakeholders. It, however, declined further action due inter alia to perceived costs 
and beneﬁts of the venture. See European Commission, ‘European Contract Law and the Revision of 
the Acquis: The Way Forward (Communication) COM (2004) 651 ﬁnal and European Commission, 
First Annual Progress Report on European Contract Law and the Acquis Review COM (2005) 456 ﬁnal.
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facilitate customisation by providing for and packaging the necessary information in 
one place. Depending on the proﬁle of the intended user, a website such as this may 
allow an expert to decide on the sequence in which categories are presented, or set a 
“Lo-Hi” default for the unwary user.
The picture is not entirely rosy, however. For one, how are laws to be categorised? 
Comparative lawyers have, traditionally, categorised laws based on their traditions. 
Generally speaking, the comparative endeavour distinguishes laws based on their 
history, territory, ideology or religion.104 These classiﬁcations are sometimes the 
subject of disagreement, and yet, by and large, those who apply the (functional) com-
parative legal method do not seek to question these categorisations.105 Importantly, 
classiﬁcations such as these are aimed at academic comparisons, and a means of jus-
tifying why certain sets of laws or comparators are investigated whilst others, dis-
carded. This is unsurprising, given that it was the academic who invented and nurtured 
these labels. 
Yet, the utility of academic categorisations may be limited when helping end-users 
compare or choose suitable laws. This begs the question – what then would be useful? 
Law and economics scholars might offer ‘efﬁciency’ since efﬁcient default rules 
reduce transaction costs and efﬁcient mandatory rules internalise externalities. With-
out surveying the users themselves, any suggested answer would be pure conjecture. 
In the past ten years, the Commission has consulted with and surveyed various stake-
holders about the problems of diverse contract laws within the Union. Most of these 
touch on the fact of differences and sentiment towards uniform law, however, rather 
than preferences as regards the content of the rules.106 That having been said, some 
commercial parties have indicated a preference for predictability and autonomy.107 
The empirical basis of such indications have yet to be veriﬁed, and, indeed, no study 
has yet been undertaken to discover what other preferences end users might harbour 
or how these preferences rank. Such preferences may then be considered as attributes 
laws have or lack. Once these have been ascertained, it may be possible to reclassify 
laws – and those parts of laws – to facilitate comparison and selection.
On a separate note, in seeking to help ease the end user’s decision-making process, 
the facilitator faces the same, classical, comparative law problems ensuring this task 
is done accurately by ensuring the correct information is presented correctly. Regard-
less of whether the comparator is that of predictability or autonomy, how can some-
104 Thus laws are commonly divided into the common law tradition, those that are akin to Roman 
law, French law or German law, Socialist law, and Ecclessiastical or Sharia or Hindu law – see for 
instance K. Zweigert and H. Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (T. Weir. tr, 3 edn, Oxford 
University Press 1998) and J. Smits (ed.) Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2008).
105 This is of course no criticism of such works, whose purpose is to make (functional) comparisons 
of their subject matter, rather than to arbitrate on academic boundary disputes.
106 This is due largely to the kinds of questions framed by the Commission in its surveys.
107 See for instance the International Chamber of Commerce’s response to the Commission’s Com-
munication on European Contract Law COM (2001) 398 ﬁnal at 4 (accessed at http://ec.europa.eu/
consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/comments/2.5.2.pdf).
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one from Germany correctly identify the salient features of Greek contract law or 
make a neutral comparison with Estonian contract law? Academics themselves can-
not be trusted to do so, and neither can government institutions, each of whom may 
have a vested interest in promoting a certain set of rules over another.108
Finally, while it may be a simple task to compare jams – say, with reference to 
colour or texture or taste – how does one go about comparing laws for the purposes 
of choosing a law to govern a particular (complex) transaction? Already, in the 1940s, 
Friedrech von Hayek talked about price as the mechanism by which vital information 
about a product is transmitted.109 Consumers are largely reliant on price as a substitute 
for ﬁnding out, for instance, about the quality of that particular product. In taxation, 
which is the basis for Tiebout’s theory on regulatory competition,110 one might sur-
mise the price mechanism to be the tax incentives a ﬁrm might get from relocating 
jurisdictions. Where is this price mechanism in the market for contract laws?
Of course, in some respects, markets have changed in the hundred years since 
Hayek stated his view. The above-mentioned example of price comparison websites 
is indicative of how much easier the ﬂow and packaging of information has facilitated 
our decision-making process. Yet, regardless of how advanced technology becomes, 
one cannot run away from the fundamental problem of ﬁnding the right comparators 
to make the right comparison. As regards brick and mortar products, the primary 
comparator is price. With laptops, one might otherwise start with screen size. As 
regards mobile phones, a possible distinction might be between smart phones and 
their more dated cousins. How does one compare intangible products like the law? 
Functional comparative law avoids the problem, since the comparative analysis inves-
tigates whether, why and how the comparators are similar or different. Value judg-
ments, in this vein, are excluded from consideration. Assertions that the common law 
is more efﬁcient than civil laws continue to be debated,111 partly, it is submitted, due 
to the lack of a neutral replacement for the price mechanism. The vibrancy of such 
criticism is a foretaste of the possible controversy in constructing a simple litmus test 
for end user preferences; and represents an obstinate obstacle to successfully imple-
menting this strategy for the law market.
Conclusion
There is certainly a lot of choice going around in the market for contract law. This 
is a good thing, since choice is key to self-determination – and all its attendant 
moral and economic and psychic virtues – and may help improve our laws. Yet 
108 For an overview, see G. Low, Hoe evidence-based is het Europese beleid op het vlak van privaat-
recht? Een case study van het Gemeenschappelijk Europees Kooprecht (above n 86).
109 See F.A. Von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society 35 The American Economic Review 
519 (1945).
110 See C.M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures (above n 16).
111 R. La Porta and others, Law and Finance 106 Journal of Political Economy 1116 (1998).
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CESL’s introduction is a timely reminder that there is such a thing as choice over-
load. It would give CESL far too much credit to say it would cause this phenom-
enon, though its introduction certainly would not help improve matters. The various 
factors outlined above suggest that, for a variety of reasons, some firms would do 
well in this environment, some would cope, while others would struggle. In light 
of this, if the Commission’s assumption is that offering more choice facilitates and 
strengthens trade across the Single Market, it is a simplistic one to make.
Drawing on the reasons for overload, suggestions were made to reduce the number 
of options or to reduce the number of differences between options – i.e. harmonisa-
tion – and to categorise laws in such a manner as to assist in comparisons. As regards 
reduction, this solution is admittedly of limited viability given past resistance to har-
monisation. On the matter of categorisation, much work remains to be done to map 
the relevant behaviour and translate that into workable comparators in the legal 
domain. In attempting to address the problems of informational and choice overload 
in the law market, the road ahead is thus ﬁlled with both promise and pitfall. 
